Rational beings

I am going to try to clarify and then make an objection to the implications of Kant's categorical imperative to "act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." (Kant). I think that Kant is talking somewhat to the well-known Golden Rule- do unto others as you would have them do unto you- in this part. However, he seems to not accept the happiness and general benefits to the person who is acting this way. I believe instead that Kant thinks you should do that not because of any of the benefits you will receive, but instead because in order to act morally, you must do this strictly from duty. My first objection is that when he posits this, he only talks about rational beings being the ends to consider. This is a very anthropocentric view, as we can only prove that humans have the capacity for rational thought- which means that any duty we have towards animals is going to always come back to what it means for humans. While I am apprehensive to make the argument that animals should have inherent value as well as humans, I do believe that because humans have the capacity for rational thought, we accrue a moral duty to those that do not, whether they are animals or babies or other humans with mental handicaps. It would be nice to just make a normative statement that this should be so by asserting that living things have intrinsic value- but that means there is value without anyone to value it- and since valuing is done by the humans who are doing the philosophizing, I don’t think the inherent value argument stands. Instead I think this good can come from something like holding ecosystems as a good on a whole, which is where all of these other conceivable goods come from.

Korsgaard, Christine M. (2012-04-19). Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) (Kindle Locations 1659-1661). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.