Blog #3

One point in particular stuck out at me in these chapters: “Namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all other desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain” (10). Mills stated earlier that one’s identification of pleasure and pain are open to interpretation. With this I agree, however, I think what is “desirable” to someone can vary as well. Not only that, but I think human actions should not be broken down into such simplistic points (pleasure and pain).  An act that is desirable to oneself may cause pain to oneself, or even to another person.  In this case, pain would be present, but the act would have been desirable. One example that comes to mind is a soldier laying down his/her own life for another.  To that individual, dying is a desirable act, but it is not free from pain.  But to return to my original point, which was that “desire” can vary from person to person.  This also goes along with differentiating morals.  What someone could consider desirable based on personal morals, may be completely different for someone else, which also means that the definitions of pleasure and pain to those two individuals would also differentiate.  I’m not so sure linking pleasure, pain, and desire are the most accurate words to relate to morality with.