The Desire to Do Good

Kant sets himself apart from the utilitarians by distinguishing the rational and the empirical.  The utilitarian view posits that every action is based on pleasure and pain, and that in cases where people make some kind of sacrifice for a greater good, this can be explained because they are gaining mental pleasure by being able to feel good about what they have done. 

Kant observes that under this view, one might think that there is really no morality at all in the world.  He counters this possibility by adding a third factor to their pleasure/pain dichotomy: duty.  Kant believes that duty goes beyond simply feeling a greater amount of pleasure.  He believes it is another factor entirely, dependent on reason and not on emotion.  For this reason, he argues that the only way to avoid thinking that there is no virtue in the world is to hold the conviction that “reason by itself and independently of all appearances commands what ought to happen.”

I would add to Kant's argument that while he is right that it is essential to have a part of duty that is completely rational, duty done because someone gains pleasure from it can still have moral value.  If someone, because of their experiences, is able to draw more and more pleasure from doing their duty, this is a desirable outcome.   Aspiring to achieve this state would come from good will, which Kant believes is intrinsically good.  If one strives to be the kind of person who gains pleasure from doing good, this has moral weight because they have not actually received said pleasure yet, and the actual receiving of the pleasure when they accomplish this goal does not diminish the initial moral weight of the desire to do good. The initial desire for pleasure through good deeds is more than just a desire for pleasure, because they could find any number of other ways to take pleasure, but choose to do it through their sense of duty.