On the intrinsic value of parenthood

On pg. 241 of Hursthouse's Virtue Theory and Abortion, she takes it as a premise that parenthood is an intrinsically valuable thing, and mentions having argued for it in an earlier piece of hers that I am, sadly, unable to access. I have serious doubts about this premise, and despite having very little presented material to argue against, I'll be doing my best to make a point that stands alone against the premise rather than leaning against an opposing argument.


First, I feel the need to dismiss the idea that simply because it may be considered to be the greater purpose of humanity or, truly, of the majority of living beings to reproduce and thus perpetuate the species, that it can be considered an intrinsically worthwhile act. Simply because something is in line with nature, doesn't mean that it has intrinsic worth, and to claim so is fallacious.


Also, it needs to be made clear that I am not arguing that parenthood cannot have value, but only that it is not necessarily or intrinsically valuable. Of course it can have value given the right situation and right people, but in the wrong situation, say in one where the parent(s) could not adequately care for the child, or one in which the child would grow up to be a detriment to society, it is either not worthwhile or would simply be a net negative to be a parent.