Li's Flawed Drowning Example

In “Grown Children’s Filial Obligation” Chenyang Li argues that even if a grown child does not have a friendship with or love for his parents, he still bound by filial obligation. Li argues that if an adult does not feel grateful for receiving life and an upbringing from his parents, then that adult has a weak moral conscience. Differing from Jane English, who argues the parent-child obligation should be based on love and friendship and not “owing” a favor because the child did not ask to be born, Li argues favors can be done without asking for help, and those favors create obligations. He provides the example of Barbara, whose child has fallen into a pond. If Al jumps in to save the child, without Barbara explicitly asking for help, Al has still done her a favor, and she should owe Al. I will argue that this example is flawed, and in fact supports English’s view that parent-child duty is better off coming from a sense of love.

Li’s version of the drowning child example presents a view of humanity that I find disturbing. Al does not jump in the pond so that Barbara will “owe” him, and if he does I believe Al is acting immorally. If, following the accident Al expected favors from Barbara until she paid off the “debt” of his action, I believe most individuals would find Al’s behavior as unethical. One does not behave morally in order to be owed a favor; Al jumped in the pond because of the value he places on human life and his love of the common humanity shared between all the parties involved. Barbara may owe Al a thank you, but she should do this, and any other favor out of friendship, not a sense of debt. It is wrong for Al to feel like he is owed for behaving in a way that any moral human would behave, just as it is wrong for a parent to expect that they are owed simply for caring and raising a child, behavior that is expected of all moral humans.